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iV

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature

Of The Case
Daniel Chemobieff appeals from the

court’s

summary dismissal of his

Statement

Of The

Facts

district court’s

opinion afﬁrming the magistrate

petition for post-conviction relief.

And Course Of The Proceedings

The Idaho Supreme Court explained

the facts and proceedings underlying Chemobieff’ s

conviction for driving under the inﬂuence With an excessive blood alcohol content:

On September 1 1, 2013, at around

11:00 p.m., Idaho State Police Corporal Matthew

Sly responded t0 a request for assistance from another ofﬁcer

Chemobieff over

Upon

Who had

pulled

Corporal Sly noticed the odor of
Chernobieff’s
an alcoholic beverage, that
eyes were “glassy and bloodshot,” and
in a trafﬁc stop.

arrival,

speech was “slow and lethargic.”

Corporal Sly also noticed that
Chemobieff was agitated and appeared t0 have difﬁculty answering questions.

that his

Based upon these observations, Corporal Sly asked Chernobieff to perform
standard ﬁeld sobriety tests, but Chemobieff refused. Consequently, Corporal Sly
placed Chemobieff under arrest for suspicion of driving under the inﬂuence
(“DUI”) and placed him in the patrol car. In the car, Corporal Sly played the audio
version of the administrative license suspension form for Chemobieff and began
the ﬁfteen minute wait period required for a breath test. However, Chemobieff
refused the breath

Corporal Sly then contacted the on-call prosecutor for
The prosecutor asked

test.

assistance in obtaining a warrant for a blood sample.

Corporal Sly to transport Chemobieff t0 the jail, Where a conference call would be
set up with the on-call magistrate to obtain a search warrant. The prosecutor then

Over approximately ten
minutes, the prosecutor attempted to call the magistrate between three and ﬁve
times and left one 0r two voicemail messages. Unable to reach the magistrate to
obtain a warrant, the prosecutor directed Corporal Sly t0 perform a blood draw due

unsuccessfully attempted to contact the magistrate.

Corporal Sly contacted the phlebotomist to perform a
results indicated Chemobieffs blood alcohol content was

t0 exigent circumstances.

blood draw, and the

test

0.226.

The State charged Chernobieff with DUI with an excessive blood alcohol content.
Chemobieff ﬁled a motion to suppress, asserting that the warrantless blood draw
violated his rights under both the United States and Idaho Constitutions.

State V. Chernobieff, 161 Idaho 537, 539,

387 P.3d 790, 792 (2016).

During the hearing on Chernobieff’s motion

t0 suppress,

Mr. Bandy,

who was

the on-call

prosecutor for search warrants the night 0f Chemobieff’ s arrest, testiﬁed about What occurred after

he received a phone
A.

I

call

from Trooper Sly about obtaining a blood draw from Chemobieff:

had Trooper Sly give

suspicion for the stop, the

PC

me

a run through 0f the reasonable articulable

and the request for the blow, as
submit to a breathalyzer.

for the investigation

well as

how the

Q.

Based 0n What he told you, What did you conclude?

driver articulated his refusal t0

I concluded that we should seek the approval of the on-call magistrate for a
blood draw warrant t0 secure a sample 0f the driver’s blood due to the evanescent

A.

nature of blood alcohol dissipating rapidly from the bloodstream, time

was of the

essence.

Q.

And

so the phone call ended with the corporal, and what did

you d0 next?

would make efforts t0 contact the on-call
was Judge Mike Oths, and that I would call
him back 0r that he should call me back if he hadn’t heard from me once he arrived
at the station at the in-tox room 0r at the Ada County Jail Where the phlebotomist
was going t0 respond.
A.

I

instructed the corporal that

which

magistrate,

Q.

I

I

believe at the time

Did he return your

call?

A.

He

Q.

So how many times

A.

I’m not sure

had attempted to call on-call Magistrate Mike Oths
using the personal cell number of his that I have that is his requested method 0f
contact. I called that number and received n0 response. I repeated the call to make
sure that I had dialed the correct number. Ihad, I received his voice mail and left
him a voice mail requesting that he return my call and the nature of my call was t0
request a blood draw warrant.
did. In the interim

the third call

conference

if it

total

was

was When

call in the

I

I

did you call that number?

three or four, but

1

believe

it

was

at least three.

Upon

had made contact With Trooper Sly, attempted t0
1 received n0 response again and left a

judge, at Which time

subsequent message.
Q.

Okay. So you made four

A.

And

morning.

1|

Mike Oths

I

can

tell

you

t0

for sure

ﬁve attempts
it

was

three,

day and found

that his

it

could have been ﬁve.

It’s

early

maybe two. I did confer With Judge
ringer was off on his cell phone.

did leave at least one voice mail,

the next

t0 contact the on-call judge?

MR. DEATON: Obj ection, move to

THE COURT:

Well,

I

don’t think

Took me

sustain the objection.

strike that as hearsay, speculation.

it’s

relevant.

don’t

I

G0

a while to get there.

know

that

be

it’s -- I’ll

ahead.

BY MS. SIMMONS:
Q.
the

Okay. So you attempted to conference call the judge in while you were on
phone With Corporal Sly, you were unable to do so. So What happened next?

At that point I informed Trooper Sly that we had made substantial efforts to
try and contact the on—call magistrate and that based on our inability to get in touch
With him, that we would then default back t0 exigent circumstances that would
A.

provide an exception t0 the warrant requirement due to the unavailability 0f
securing a warrant in a timely fashion.

(R.,

pp.46-47 (2/14/14

Tr., p.22,

L.9

The Idaho Supreme Court

-

p.24,

L24.)

further explained:

The magistrate court denied Chemobieff‘s [suppression] motion, ﬁnding

that the

exigent circumstances exception t0 the warrant requirement applied under the

speciﬁc facts 0f this easel”

1

The magistrate ruled

Subsequently, Chernobieff ﬁled a conditional guilty

end of the suppression motion hearing:

at the

[T]he defendant did delay the process. And as Mr. Deaton put forth, Mr. Bandy
good-faith attempts t0 follow the procedure set forth in Ada County to get a

made

At 11:00 p.m.

there is only one on-call judge, and even if Mr.
judge and get that judge up, that judge isn’t really
situated t0 hear probable cause because the one digital recorder we have is With the

search warrant.

Bandy were

to call another

on-call judge.

So

it’s

kind of a pickle

What McNeely

said

was

When you

in a

can’t reach the on-call judge.

modern age

there are

ways

t0 get a

quick

answer from a judge t0 get a quick search warrant, and Ada County in response t0
that set up a process for it and it's a process that works I think 99 percent of the
time.

work

and Mr. Bandy didn’t have a
lot of choices, and he instructed Corporal Sly t0 take the blood, Which is a call I
think Mr. Bandy can make, and he does so at his peril. But prosecutors are asked
to make those kind of calls all the time. They’re called to ﬁnd out if ofﬁcers can
break down the door and ofﬁcers are told yes 0r n0. So I don’t fault Mr. Bandy for
how he handled it, I do think he has the authority and he did not usurp the judge’s
Unfortunately

authority.

(R., p.51 (2/14/14

And

it

so that’s

didn’t

in this instance

my ruling.

Tn, p.41, L.14 — p.42, L15.)

motion t0 suppress. Chernobieff
timely appealed to the district court, Which afﬁrmed the magistrate court’s decision.
Chemobieff again appealed and the Idaho Courts oprpeals afﬁrmed. Chemobieff
sought, and the Supreme Court granted, review.

plea, reserving his right to appeal the denial ofhis

State V. Chernobieff, 161 Idaho 537, 539,

387 P.3d 790, 792 (2016) (explanation added).

In reviewing whether exigent circumstances existed justifying a warrantless blood draw,

the Idaho

Supreme Court afﬁrmed Chemobieffs conviction, concurring with the

conclusion

that,

ﬁeld sobriety

under the

tests,

totality

was

there

district court’s

0f the circumstances, “[e]ven excluding the delay related t0 the
substantial

evidence to support the magistrate’s findings.”

Chernobieff, 161 Idaho at 541, 387 P.3d at 794.

The Court

cited the “lateness of the hour, the

various delays that occurred in the proceedings from the time Corporal Sly

was

called,” the

“dissipation in the level 0f blood alcohol With the passage of time” and the fact that the prosecutor

attempted “to obtain a warrant through the on-call magistrate

On October
The

1,

who

could not be reached.” Li.

2019, Chernobieff ﬁled a petition for post-conviction relief claiming:

on—call prosecutor testiﬁed at the

motion

to suppress hearing that

he

reason he could not reach the on-call magistrate was because the
had been turned off on the magistrate’s cell phone. Incredibly, defense
counsel obj ected t0 this evidence and successfully moved t0 strike it. Not only did
he strike the evidence showing that there was not good cause for the unavailability
0f an on-call magistrate, defense counsel himself did not call the on-call magistrate
as a Witness, nor present any other evidence showing the absence 0f good cause, or
even argue that the lack 0f a back-up system in Ada County showed a lack 0f good
later learned the

ringer

cause.

The magistrate denied

the motion t0 suppress and Petitioner entered a

was eventually appealed all the way up t0 the
Idaho Supreme Court. The Idaho Supreme Court afﬁrmed, holding, relevant here,
While it was the state’s burden t0 prove good cause for the magistrate’s
unavailability, it had to presume the trial court ruled correctly because there was n0
such evidence in the record because defense counsel objected and had it stricken.
conditional guilty plea and the matter

Petitioner asserts this

motion

to suppress

is

cognizable ineffective assistance of counsel, t0 Wit, that the

would have been granted and/or

its

denial reversed but for

defense counsel’s action/inaction since the evidence stricken established there

was

not good cause for the magistrate’s unavailability. Counsel’s objection and striking

0f the evidence were based on ignorance of the law because he argued the

ability

to obtain a search warrant is not a relevant factor for exigent circumstances,
is

directly contrary t0 the controlling law,

S.Ct.

McNeely

v.

which

Missouri, 569 U.S. 141, 133

1552 (2013).
Finally,

had the

results

of the blood

test

been suppressed, Petitioner would

not have pled guilty t0 DUI-excessive 0r DUI, nor, according t0 the prosecutor,

would he have been prosecuted
(R., pp.7-8.)

The

state

for

DUI

at all.

ﬁled an Answer and a motion for summary disposition.

Actions entry for 8/22/18), 63-64, 65-66.)

(R.,

pp.2 (Reg. of

After a hearing 0n the motion, the magistrate court

granted the state’s motion, ruling:

I

just simply don’t think that the Strickland[2] standard has

supreme court was aware that this was a product of human
of the lack 0f redundancy of the system.

error.

Iunderstand where you’re coming from, Mr. Silvey.
I

also think we’re treading

worst, this

was a mistake.

I

0n a

don’t think

little bit
it

was a

I

just simply disagree.

of dangerous
fatal

been met. The
They were aware

mistake.

having that information come in would have changed anything

territory.
I

At very

don’t think that

at all at

any 0f the

three levels.

of Mr. Deaton’s. It certainly may
I’m
have been an error 0f the law.
not sure Iwould g0 that far. Regardless, Ithink
it was a strategic decision he was entitled to make, that isn’t one that can be 0r
should be second-guessed at this point in time.
I

also think this

was a

strategic decision

And, ﬁnally, I would just comment again that I don’t think that the phone
off is any less good cause than the cell tower being down. To me, I focus more 0n
What the State did t0 try and get the warrant under the guidelines that were available
at the time.

So with
(12/3/ 1 8 TL, p.26, L. 1 0

that,

I’m denying the motion.

— p.27, L.12

And that’s

(included in record as “Appeal Exhibit Transcript.pdf”).)

magistrate court entered a Judgment (R. p.67.)

2

E

it.

Strickland V. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1985).
5

The

Chernobieff appealed t0 the

(ﬂ

district court. (R.,

pp.68-70.) After the parties submitted briefs

generally 4/10/20 Aug. to the Appellate Record), and presented oral argument

(ﬂ R., p.3

(Reg. ofActions entry for 5/16/19», the district court entered an Opinion 0n Appeal (R., pp.74-84
(attached as

Appendix A)), afﬁrming the magistrate

court’s

summary

dismissal of Chernobieff’s

post-conviction petition. Chernobieff ﬁled a timely appeal. (R., pp.85-87.)

ISSUE
Chemobieff states the

issue

on appeal

as:

WHETHER THE DISTRICT COURT, SITTING AS AN APPELLATE
COURT, ERRED BY AFFIRMING THE SUMMARY DISMISSAL OF THE
PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF BASED ON INEFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL, AFTER DEFENSE COUNSEL OBJECTED TO
AND STRUCK FROM EVIDENCE THE REASON THERE WAS NO GOOD
CAUSE FOR THE STATE’S INABILITY TO OBTAIN AN AFTER-HOURS
SEARCH WARRANT
(Appellant’s brief, p.8.)

The

state rephrases the issue as:

Has Chernobieff failed t0 demonstrate any error
court’s

summary

in the district court’s

dismissal of his post-conviction petition?

afﬁrmance of the magistrate

ARGUMENT
Chemobieff Has Failed To Demonstrate Any Error In The
Magistrate Court’s

A.

Summary Dismissal Of His

Court Afﬁrmance

District

Of The

Post—Conviction Petition

Introduction

The

district court

afﬁrmed the magistrate

petition for post-conviction relief,

trial

ﬁnding

that

summary

court’s

dismissal 0f Chemobieff’s

he failed t0 make a prima facie showing that his

counsel was ineffective at the suppression hearing by obj ecting

t0,

and moving

t0 strike, the

prosecutor’s testimony that, the day after he unsuccessfully tried t0 call the magistrate judge to

obtain a search warrant for a blood draw, the judge said his phone ringer had been

has failed t0 demonstrate that the

district court erred in

off.

Chernobieff

afﬁrming the magistrate court’s summary

dismissal 0f his post-conviction petition.

Standard

B.

Of Review

On review

0f a decision rendered by a

district court in its intermediate appellate capacity,

the reviewing court “directly review[s] the district court’s decision.” State V. DeWitt, 145 Idaho

709, 71

1,

184 P.3d 215, 217

758 (2008)).

afﬁrm the

m,

(Ct.

App. 2008)

(citing

Losser

If the district court properly applied the

district court’s order.

EQ

(citing

V. Bradstreet,

law

145 Idaho 670, 183 P.3d

t0 the facts, the appellate court will

w“, 145 Idaho 670, 183 P.3d 758; Nicholls

102 Idaho 559, 633 P.2d 1137 (1981)). The appellate court “reviews the magistrate record

to determine

whether there

is

substantial

and competent evidence

to support the magistrate’s

ﬁndings of fact and Whether the magistrate’s conclusions of law follow from those findings.”
V.

Tregeagle, 161 Idaho 763, 765, 391 P.3d 21, 23 (Ct. App. 2017).

free

V.

review over the

Evensiosky

V. State,

district court’s application

The

m

appellate court exercises

of the Uniform Post Conviction Procedure Act.

136 Idaho 189, 190, 30 P.3d 967, 968 (2001).

On

summary

appeal from

reviews the record to determine
applicant’s favor,

would

if a

dismissal of a post—conviction petition, the appellate court

genuine issue 0f material fact

entitle the applicant to the

801, 807, 839 P.2d 1215, 1221 (1992); Aeschliman

(Ct.

V. State,

relief.

Matthews

V. State,

V.

Conchemco,

Inc., 111

Standards Applicable To

C.

19-4901, et seq.

Summary Dismissal Of Post-Conviction Claims
by the Uniform Post—Conviction Procedure Act.

A petition for post-conviction relief initiates

a

new and independent

proceeding in Which the petitioner bears the burden of establishing that he

Workman

V. State,

fact exists.

Idaho 851, 852, 727 P.2d 1279, 1280 (Ct. App. 1986).

Post-conviction proceedings are governed

§

122 Idaho

132 Idaho 397, 403, 973 P.2d 749, 755

App. 1999). Appellate courts freely review Whether a genuine issue of material

Edwards

LC.

requested

if resolved in the

Which,

exists,

144 Idaho 518, 522, 164 P.3d 798, 802 (2007); State

V.

is

civil

entitled t0 relief.

Bearshield, 104 Idaho

676, 678, 662 P.2d 548, 550 (1983).

Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of an application for post-conviction
relief, in

response to a party’s motion 0r on the court’s

own

initiative, if the applicant

“has not

presented evidence making a prima facie case as to each essential element of the claims upon

which the applicant bears the burden 0f proof.” Berg
739 (1998). Until controverted by the
are, for

state, allegations in

131 Idaho 5 17, 518, 960 P.2d 738,

a veriﬁed post-conviction application

purposes of determining Whether t0 hold an evidentiary hearing, deemed

m, 96 Idaho

542, 545, 531 P.2d 1187, 1190 (1975). However, the court

either the applicant’s

mere conclusory

applicant’s conclusions of law.

Roman

V. State,

V. State,

Farrier

allegations, unsupported

V. State,

is

by speciﬁc

facts,

Cooper

V.

not required to accept

by admissible evidence,

0r the

135 Idaho 797, 799, 25 P.3d 110, 112 (2001);

125 Idaho 644, 647, 873 P.2d 898, 901 (Ct. App. 1994).

speculation, unsupported

true.

Bare assertions and

d0 not make out a prima facie case for ineffective

assistance 0f counsel.

Roman, 125 Idaho

at

649, 873 P.2d at 903. Further, allegations contained

in a post-conviction petition are insufﬁcient for granting relief When they are clearly disproved

the record 0f the original proceeding 0r do not justify relief as a matter 0f law.

Idaho

D.

at

522, 164 P.3d at 802; Charboneau

V. State,

Of Counsel Claims

alleging ineffective assistance 0f counsel

both deﬁcient performance and resulting prejudice. Strickland
88 (1984); State

V.

Workman, 144

144 Idaho 900, 903, 174 P.3d 870, 873 (2007).

Standards Applicable T0 Ineffective Assistance

A post-conviction petitioner

by

V.

must demonstrate

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-

Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 137, 774 P.2d 299, 307 (1989). Under Strickland,

a defendant must demonstrate both that (1) his counsel’s performance

fell

below an objective

standard 0f reasonableness, and (2) a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the result

0f the proceedings would have been

m,

different.

Strickland,

114 Idaho 758, 761, 760 P.2d 1174, 1177 (1988).

counsel’s conduct

is

(Ct.

There

is

at

687-688, 694; Aragon

V.

a strong presumption that

Within the Wide range 0f reasonable professional assistance. Gibson V. State,

110 Idaho 631, 634, 718 P.2d 283, 286 (1986); Davis

1248

466 U.S.

App. 1989).

When

V. State,

116 Idaho 401, 406, 775 P.2d 1243,

the alleged deﬁciency involves counsel’s advice in relation t0 a

guilty plea, “in order to satisfy the ‘prejudice’ requirement, the defendant

must show

that there is

a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would

have insisted 0n going

t0 trial.” Hill V. Lockhart,

474 U.S.

52, 58 (1985) (footnote

and

citations

omitted).

E.

The District Court Correctly Concluded That Chemobieff Failed To Make
Showing For Post-Conviction Relief
For

its

A Prima Facie

response t0 Chernobieffs arguments, the state relies upon, and incorporates as if

fully set forth herein, the district court’s

Opinion on Appeal
10

(R., pp.74-84),

which

is

attached to

this brief as

Appendix A.

In addition to the court’s analysis

and conclusions, the

state

makes

the

following arguments in support 0f the district court’s opinion.

Deﬁcient Performance

1.

Chernobieff argues that his

to,

and moved

attempts to

trial

counsel’s performance

was deﬁcient because he objected

to strike, the prosecutor’s testimony that, after three to

make phone

ﬁve

Tr.,

morning

contact with the on-call magistrate for a search warrant, he “did confer

with Judge Mike Oths the next day and found that his ringer was off 0n his
(2/14/14

failed early

p.24, Ls.1-5).

Chernobieff contends that

cell

phone”

if the prosecutor’s “ringer”

(R.,

p.47

testimony

remained in evidence, the magistrate judge would have concluded the exigent circumstances
exception to the warrant requirement did not apply.

(E

generally Appellant’s brief.)

Chemobieff’ s argument does not hold up for several reasons.
a.

The Obiected T0 And Stricken Testimony That The Magistrate Said His Cell
Phone Ringer Was Off Was Not Favorable To Chemobieff

Chemobieff argues

that

“had

trial

counsel not objected to (and then had struck) the

testimony that the ringer was turned off 0n the on-call magistrate’s
the unavailability of ta judge t0 issue a warrant

pp.27-28.)

cell

phone, that good cause for

would not have been shown.” (Appellant’s

brief,

Contrary t0 Chemobieff’s assessment of the “ringer” testimony, the fact that the

prosecutor sought (perhaps presciently) to explain

“why” he could not make contact with

magistrate judge shows that he reasonably concluded such testimony

circumstances.

By

objecting t0 such testimony and asking that

it

would help

the

establish exigent

be stricken, Chernobieff’s

trial

counsel also determined such testimony would help the state establish an exigency.

Moreover, the mistaken, even ifnegligent, turning off 0fthe on-call magistrate’s
ringer could reasonably be seen as an occurrence so rare that

it

is

circumstances weighing in favor 0f a ﬁnding 0f exigent circumstances.

11

cell

phone

part of the totality of

The magistrate court

hearing the suppression motion explained there was only one on-call judge
digital recorder

Which stayed With the

search warrants

worked

on-call judge,

(the magistrate thought)

at

11:00 p.m., one

and Ada County’s process for obtaining quick

99 percent of the time.

(R., p.51 (2/4/ 14 TL, p.41,

L.18 — p.42, L.4.)

Chemobieff argues, Without any relevant

authority, that the on-call magistrate’s purported

negligence in turning his cell phone ringer off cannot justify a ﬁnding that exigent circumstances
existed.

(E Appellant’s brief, pp.27-33.)

factors controllable

by

constituting exigencies,

cell

Chernobieff suggests a line 0f demarcation between

the court system (presumably including judicial negligence) as not

and factors not controllable by the court system (such as phone

towers falling down) qualifying as exigencies.

(Id.,

Whatever merit Chernobieff’ s suggestion has
circumstances, his

trial

pp.28-29.)

for divining

Which

factors qualify as exigent

counsel’s performance could not have been deﬁcient for not following his

legally unendorsed proposal.

performance Where counsel

M,

The Idaho Supreme Court

fails t0

“will generally not

ﬁnd deﬁcient

argue a novel theory in an undeveloped area of law.” Sc_hogg

148 Idaho 622, 630, 226 P.3d 1269, 1277 (2010). Whether the ringer being turned off 0n

the on-call magistrate’s cell

phone does, or does

not,

circumstances” for obtaining a warrantless blood draw

makes sense

that

showing the prosecutor’s attempts

preferred cell phone) were futile

would help

his attempt t0 obtain a search warrant.

weigh
is,

in favor

at the

very

of a ﬁnding of “exigent

least,

an open question.

It

t0 contact the on-call magistrate judge (0n his

establish that exigent circumstances interfered with

Chemobieff’ s

trial

counsel cannot be deemed deﬁcient for

concluding, as did the prosecutor, that the “ringer” testimony was favorable t0 the

it

lines or

excluded from consideration.

12

state,

and having

The Burden Of Showing WhV The Prosecutor Failed To Contact The
Magistrate Was First Announced In Chemobieff’s Direct Appeal, And Is
Placed On The State

b.

Only through the Idaho Supreme Court’s decision
incumbent upon the

was so problematic
court’s Opinion

state to

Chemobieff’ s direct appeal

is it

now

demonstrate “why” contacting a magistrate to obtain a search warrant

that exigent circumstances justiﬁed a warrantless

blood draw.

As

the district

0n Appeal explains:

Prior to the Idaho
there

in

was no

Supreme Court’s statement

authority that

When

a magistrate

enforcement, the State has the burden ofshowing

is

in the suppression appeal

unable to be reached by law

why that is the

case and that good

cause exists to excuse the unavailability. That statement came in the direct appeal

have had knowledge 0f the statement at the
time 0fthe suppression hearing. Also, as noted by the State, the appellant presented
no evidence as to what the magistrate would have actually testiﬁed to concerning
the reason he did not respond t0 the State’s efforts to contact him that evening.
0f his case.

Trial counsel could not

While the U.S. Supreme Court

in Missouri

v.

McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 133

S.Ct. 1152 (2013), references the “procedures in place for obtaining a warrant or

the availability of a magistrate judge,” as possible relevant factors,

concerning the reason

why a magistrate is unavailable as

it

says nothing

a relevant factor and does

not specify 0r indicate that the State would have the burden of explaining the
magistrate’s unavailability and have the burden t0 demonstrate

good cause

t0

excuse the magistrate’s unavailability.

(R.,

pp.81-82 (emphasis added).)

In addition t0 correctly explaining that Chernobieff’ s trial

counsel could not have been deﬁcient for not knowing about a non-existent

requirement that there be an explanation about “why” a magistrate
enforcement, the

is

district court

noted that, post—Chernobieff,

it is

is

(at the

time) judicial

unable t0 be reached by law

the state’s burden to do so

— Which

very signiﬁcant.

Even

if McNeely

can be read as requiring the

state to

demonstrate

why the prosecutor was

was

the state’s burden t0 d0

unable to contact the on-call magistrate t0 obtain a search warrant,
so in order to

show exigent circumstances. As

call magistrate is

the Idaho

it

Supreme Court explained, “When an on-

unable t0 be reached by law enforcement, the State has the burden 0f showing

13

why that

is

the case and that

good cause

541, 387 P.3d at 794. Therefore,
present, evidence

is true.

It

was

it

exists for the unavalability.”3

was not Chemobieff’ s burden

Chernobieff, 161 Idaho at

t0 present, 0r allow the state t0

showing “Why” the prosecutor could not reach the magistrate. Just the opposite

his trial counsel’s duty t0 try t0

prevent the state from meeting

its

keep such testimony out 0f evidence in order

to

burden 0fproof.4 Trial counsel could not have been performing

deﬁciently for doing so.

The

state recognizes that in Chernobieff, the

Idaho Supreme Court

said:

Here, the State sought to present evidence as t0 the reason for the magistrate’s

and the evidence was stricken from the
n0 such evidence in the record, the Courtpresumes that the trial court
ruled correctly. Poole v. Davis, 153 Idaho 604, 607, 288 P.3d 821, 824 (2012).

unavailability, but defense counsel objected

record. With

Li.

(emphasis added).

Chernobieff’ s

trial

counsel could not have reasonably forecast

successfully keeping the state from presenting evidence showing

t0 contact the on-call magistrate, the

why the prosecutor was not able

absence 0f such evidence (Which the

presenting below) could result in a presumption 0n appeal that the

him (who bore n0 burden of proof below). Given
exception t0 the warrant requirement,

trial

that the state

that, in

trial

state

had the burden of

court correctly ruled against

had the burden 0f establishing an

counsel should have reasonably expected that direct

review of his challenge to the lower courts’ exigent circumstances ﬁndings/rulings would be based
solely

3

0n determining whether the evidence actually presented

Having

failed t0 present testimony through the prosecutor about

call magistrate

the prosecutor
4

at the

were unsuccessful, the state could have
was unable t0 contact him by phone.

Again, this argument

prosecution t0 establish

is

suppression motion hearing

why his

attempts t0 call the 0n-

called the magistrate to testify about

why

based on the assumption, arguendo, that McNeely requires the
t0 contact a judge in order to obtain a

“Why” law enforcement was unable

search warrant.
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was sufﬁcient
that

was

to

stricken

In Poole

show exigent circumstances justiﬁed

a warrantless blood

draw — not evidence

from the record.
V.

Davis, 153 Idaho 604, 288 P.3d 821 (2012), the decision relied upon in

Chernobieff for its presumption, the appealing party failed to have transcripts oftwo hearings
a part of the appellate record. The Court said
the district court abused

Idaho

costs. Li, 153
‘a

at

its

made

“could have reviewed them t0 determine Whether

it

discretion” in denying the appellants’ motion for attorney fees and

608, 288 P.3d at 825.

It

was

in that context that the Court determined, “if

party appealing an issue presents an incomplete record, this Court Will presume that the absent

portion supports the ﬁndings 0f the

(quoting State

V.

trial

court.” Li, 153 Idaho

at

607-608, 288 P.3d

at

824-825

Willoughbv, 147 Idaho 482, 488, 211 P.3d 91, 97 (2009)).

Chemobieff’s direct appeal did not involve a situation Where, as in

appealing

P0_ole, the

party failed to provide the appellate court With an adequate record of the proceedings and evidence

presented in the lower court to enable the appellate court to review the record.

Chemobieff’ s appeal challenged Whether the

state

met

its

burden below 0f presenting sufﬁcient

evidence t0 show exigent circumstances justiﬁed a warrantless blood draw.

testimony that the on-call magistrate said his
record below because

it

was

stricken

cell

Rather,

The prosecutor’s

phone ringer had been off was not a part of the

from evidence. Unlike

in Po_ole, the

Court was not deprived

of the opportunity to review any evidence presented and admitted in the lower court.
application of P0_ole’s “missing portions of the record” principle to

was, t0 say the

least, innovative.

Because Chemobieff’ s

trial

Chemobieffs

The

direct appeal

counsel could not have anticipated

such a novel ruling by the Court in Chernobieff’ s direct appeal, counsel’s performance in obj ecting
to,

and moving

to strike, the prosecutor’s testimony about

contact with the on-call magistrate

was not

deﬁcient.
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E

why he was

unable to

Schoger, 148 Idaho

at

make

cell

phone

630, 226 P.3d at

1277

(“this

Court will generally not ﬁnd deﬁcient performance where counsel

legal theory in an

(Ct.

App. 2008)

undeveloped area of law”); Piro

(“failure to

V. State,

advance a novel theory”

is

fails to

argue a novel

146 Idaho 86, 91, 190 P.3d 905, 910

not ineffective assistance 0f counsel).

Chernobieff’ s Assertions That The District Court Misstates And
Misunderstands Trial Counsel’s Argument Is Not Supported BV The Record

c.

Chernobieff contends the

district court “misstates

actual argument.” (Appellant’s brief, p.16.)

He variously

and so misunderstands

exigent circumstances.”

(Id.,

(misguided) separation 0f power argument.”
to

warrant was insufﬁcient t0 show

ﬁve attempts

be expressly arguing

t0 contact a

judge being
is

making a

that a prosecuting attorney

can never

insufﬁcient to constitute exigent circumstances.

seems

t0 establish) that the

p.17.)

“Trial counsel is not arguing about three to

“Trial counsel

counsel’s

states:

“At no time did defense counsel argue (0r examine a witness
state’s inability to contact a magistrate to secure a

trial

Rather,

trial

counsel

(Id., p. 1 8.)

authorize a warrantless blood draw regardless 0f the circumstances, exigent 0r not,

and

it

can only be done by a warrant issued by a judge.”

(1d,,

p.19.)

counsel objected, “the magistrate was left
With evaluating just the three t0 ﬁve attempts t0 reach the magistrate”—”is simply

The

state’s

theory—that, because

trial

made up

theory by the state and can be shown with certainty not to be trial
counsel’s theory or strategic decision by the simple fact that it is based on the
a

premise that the availability 0f the magistrate

which

trial

counsel believed and argued.”

is

(Id.,

relevant,

which

is

the opposite 0f

pp.19-20.)

Chemobieff’ s allegations 0f misstatements and misunderstandings by the

district

court are

overstated.

Chernobieff’ s ﬁrst statement, that “[a]t n0 time did defense counsel argue

inability

t0

contact

a

magistrate

circumstances” (Appellant’s Brief,

p.

to

1

secure

7), is

a warrant

was insufﬁcient

.

to

.

that the state’s

show exigent

belied by the record. Trial counsel argued that, despite

the prosecutor’s multiple failed attempts t0 call the magistrate, there

ﬁnding

.

that exigent circumstances permitted the warrantless

16

was no evidence

blood draw,

stating:

to support a

And

I

prosecutors t0

make good

warrants. That

they can

(R.,

’t

p.50 (2/14/14

somewhat troubled 0r cautious

think the court should be

is

in allowing

faith attempts but then t0 unilaterally authorize search

dangerous

if

prosecutors can unilaterally authoriz[e] warrants if

get infront ofajudge.

Tr.,

above record shows

—

p.36, L.23

that

p.37, L.3 (spelling modiﬁcation and emphasis added)).)

Chemobieff” s

trial

contact a magistrate t0 secure a warrant

counsel did, in

was insufﬁcient

fact,

to

The

argue that “the state’s inability to

show exigent circumstances.”

(E

Appellant’s brief, p.17.)

Chemobieff’s second statement

that, instead

0f trial counsel “arguing about three to ﬁve

attempts to contact a judge being insufﬁcient t0 constitute exigent circumstances[,]” counsel “is

making a (misguided) separation ofpowers argument”

(id., p. 1 8), is

also incorrect. Trial counsel’s

statement was:

First

because —

I

of all,

I

don’t

know

that [the prosecutor’s] opinion is all that relevant

think this case presents a

conundrum

for this court

Where

essentially

the prosecutor made an attempt to contact the judge, several attempts, three t0 ﬁve
by his testimony, but then he just authorized the blood draw. And if we’re going to
allow prosecuting attorneys to make good faith attempts — I’m not saying there was
anything but a good faith attempt — but if that’s unsuccessﬁJI to just authorize blood
draws, that is the province 0f the judicial branch, it is the province 0f your Honor
and the other judges elected and appointed in this state. It is not on prosecuting
attorneys.

(R.,

p.49 (2/4/14 Tn, p.33, L.16

0f powers argument

at the

— p.34,

L.4).)

T0 the extent

end of his comments,

argument that the prosecutor’s

inability t0

it

trial

counsel was making a separation

was wholly dependent upon

his preceding

contact the magistrate did not provide exigent

circumstances t0 skirt the warrant requirement.
Chernobieff’s third statement—again

comment—that

his trial counsel

“seems

to

made

in reference to the separation

of powers

be expressly arguing that a prosecuting attorney can

never authorize a warrantless blood draw regardless 0f the circumstances, exigent 0r not, and

it

can only be done by a warrant issued by a judge” (Appellant’s

is

17

brief,

p.19 (emphasis added»

similarly mistaken. Trial counsel’s “separation of powers”

comment was conditioned on there not

being exigent circumstances t0 allow a warrantless blood draw.

Chemobieff’s fourth statement

is

that the state’s theory that his trial counsel objected to

the prosecutor’s testimony in order to leave the magistrate “with evaluating just the three to

attempts t0 reach the magistrate”

p.19.)

He

was “simply a made up theory by the

further explains that the

“made up” nature 0f the

state’s

state[.]” (Appellant’s brief,

theory can be “shown With

certainty not to be trial counsel’s theory 0r strategic decision

by the simple

the premise that the availability of the magistrate

Which

counsel believed and argued.”

(Id.,

pp.19-20.)

is

relevant,

As shown,

ﬁve

is

fact that

it is

based on

the opposite 0f Which

regardless of his

trial

trial

counsel’s belief

0r the (allegedly suspect) origins of the state’s theory, Chernobieff’s counsel argued that the

prosecutor’s inability t0 contact the magistrate to obtain a search warrant did not constitute exigent

Without a certain showing that the

circumstances.

allegation

is

Chemobieffs

was not a proper

factor (0r

district court

it

trial

its

theory,

Chemobieffs

counsel twice said that the state’s inability to obtain a warrant

was an “improper

acknowledged

comment made by
that

“made up”

baseless.

Lastly,

The

state

the Idaho

that

factor”). (R., p.50 (2/14/14 Tn, p.35, Ls.1-6, 12-15.)

such an argument

Supreme Court

“may have been

in Chernobieﬁ’

.

.

.

.

in error in light

of the

But counsel could not foresee

might be error to exclude an explanation of the Judge’s unavailability in the absence ofprior

authority t0 that effect.”

(R., pp.82-83.)

Although Chernobieff’s

trial

counsel’s argument

was

admittedly contrary to the Supreme Court’s later determination of the applicable law, given his
other comments, as noted above, and the fact that he did not

make any

objection,

much

less

based 0n relevance, t0 the prosecutor’s testimony about his three to ﬁve failed attempts to
magistrate,

it

one

call the

appears counsel was acting on the belief that those attempts were relevant, but not

18

determinative, to determining whether there were exigent circumstances t0 justify a warrantless

blood draw. Despite

— even

if too

trial

counsel’s “improper factor” comments, he nonetheless effectively argued

broadly by saying they were not a proper factor — that the prosecutor’s failed efforts

to contact the magistrate

his trial counsel’s

d0 not support a ﬁnding of exigency. Chernobieff has failed to show

that

performance was deﬁcient.

Prejudice

2.

The magistrate

courts in post-conviction also found that Chernobieff failed to demonstrate

prejudice under Strickland, stating:

At very worst,
that
at

this

having that [“ringer”]

any of the three

don’t think

was a fatal mistake. I don’t think
information come in would have changed anything at all

was a mistake.

I

it

levels.

(12/3/18 Tr., p.26, Ls.18-22 (explanation added).)

On

appeal, Chernobieff argues that he

met

the

prejudice prong of Strickland:

Had defense counsel not obj ected and moved to strike the evidence showing
there

was no good cause

for the magistrate’s unavailability,

argued that the ability to obtain a warrant

is

and instead wrongly

not a factor for determining exigent

Circumstances, the Supreme Court would have reversed the denial 0fthe motion t0

suppress

(really,

it

should not have been denied in the ﬁrst place).

(Appellant’s brief, p.31 (emphasis added).)

Chemobieff’s argument misses the mark.
Court would have done;

would have

5

6

The

rather,

is

not what the Idaho Supreme

Whether the admission of the prosecutor’s stricken testimony

led the magistrate court to suppress the results 0f the warrantless blood draw.6

district court

The

did not opine regarding the prejudice prong of Strickland.

If the stricken testimony

state

it is

The question

would have

led t0 suppression 0f Chemobieff’ s blood test results, the

could not have pursued an enhanced

In that case, reversal of his guilty plea t0

DUI charge (0.20 BAC or higher) — only a generic DUI.
enhanced DUI would be automatic.
19

magistrate explained there

was only one

stayed with the on-call judge, and

worked
L.4.)

(the magistrate thought)

on-call judge at 11:00 p.m., one digital recorder

Ada County’s

process for obtaining quick search warrants

99 percent 0f the time.

Similarly, in Chernobieff, the Idaho

which

(R., p.51 (2/4/14 Tn, p.41,

Supreme Court

L.18 — p.42,

held, prior to describing the state’s

responsibilities in similar cases in the ﬁxture, as follows:

In

its

appellate review, the district court considered a

number of factors, including

the lateness of the hour, the various delays that occurred in the proceedings

from

the time Corporal Sly was called, and the dissipation in the level of blood alcohol
with the passage of time. The district court speciﬁcally pointed t0 the prosecutor’s

attempt t0 obtain a warrant through the on-call magistrate

The

reached.

made

district court also

Who

could not be

reference to the delay resulting from

Chemobieff’ s refusal t0 perform ﬁeld sobriety tests, but in doing so the court erred.
Any delay caused by Chernobieff’ s exercise 0f his Constitutional rights may not be
considered.

The court concluded

0f

that the magistrate considered the totality

circumstances and that the magistrate’s ﬁndings were supported by substantial
evidence. We concur. Even excluding the delay related t0 the ﬁeld sobriety tests,
there

ﬁnd

was

substantial evidence t0 support the magistrate ’sﬁndings. Therefore,

that the district court did not err in

we

afﬁrming the denial 0f the motion t0

suppress the results 0f the blood draw.

Chemobieff, 161 Idaho

at 541,

387 P.3d

at

794 (emphasis added). Given the Court’s “substantial

evidence” determination, which should be given preclusive effect insofar as
question

is

Whether there

is

it

applies here, the

a reasonable probability that, had the prosecutor’s stricken testimony

been admitted, there would not be substantial evidence showing exigency.

As argued

in section E-1

.a.

above, and relied upon here without repeating, even with the

addition 0f the prosecutor’s stricken testimony, there

magistrate court

draw.

The

would have found

there

fact that the magistrate’s cell

is

no reasonable probability

were not exigent circumstances

that the

for a warrantless blood

phone ringer was turned off was a

rarity.

There

reasonable probability that the magistrate court would have concluded that the testimony

it

is

no

and the

Idaho Supreme Court deemed substantial proof of exigent circumstances would have been

undermined merely by testimony that the on-call magistrate’s

20

cell

phone ringer was

off.

CONCLUSION
The

state respectfully requests that this

magistrate court’s

Court afﬁrm the

district court’s

order afﬁrming the

summary dismissal 0f Chernobieff’ s post-conviction petition.

DATED this 30th day of April, 2020.

/s/

John C. McKinney

JOHN C. MCKINNEY
Deputy Attorney General
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copy 0f the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to the attorney listed below by means 0f iCourt
I

File

and Serve:

GREG S. SILVEY
SILVEY LAW OFFICE, LTD.
greg@idahoapp_eals.com

/s/

John C. McKinney

JOHN C. MCKINNEY
Deputy Attorney General

JCM/dd

21

APPENDIX A

Filed:

07/22/2019 16:13:39

District, Ada County
McGrane, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk - Lyke, Martha

Fourth Judicial
Phil

IN

THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

OF THE STATE OF IDAHO,

IN

AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

DANIEL CHERNOBIEFF,
Petitioner—Appellant,

Case No. CV01-17—22652

vs.

OPINION ON APPEAL

STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

ATTORNEY FOR THE APPELLANT: GREG

S.

SILVEY

ATTORNEY FOR THE RESPONDENT: BRANDOM BECKHAM
l.

The
petition

petitioner appeals the decision of the magistrate granting

seeking post—conviction
ll.

The

NATURE OF THE CASE

following

is

summary

dismissal of his

relief.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
taken from the Court’s opinion on the direct appeal

in

the underlying

criminal case:

The Defendant was stopped on September 1 1, 2013
by Trooper Ben
Comorosky of the Idaho State Police. Following a DUI investigation, the officer
arrested the Defendant and took him to the Ada County Jail.
The trooper
contacted Ada County Prosecuting Attorney Scott Bandy to prepare a
request
for a

search warrant. That prosecutor could not reach the on-call judge. Instead
of waiting to receive a warrant, the officer had the defendant’s
blood drawn by a
phlebotomist. The test results indicated the defendant had a blood
alcohol
content of .226. The defendant moved to suppress the evidence
obtained in the

OPINION ON APPEAL — PAGE

1

Page 74

blood draw.

Appeal

The magistrate denied

the motion[.] February 11,

This Court's opinion on direct appeal

and the Idaho Supreme Court. See State
also State

v.

v.

was

affirmed by both the Idaho Court of Appeals

Chernobieff,

Chernobieff, 161 Idaho 537, 387 P.3d

The appellant subsequently
that

2015 Opinion on

at 1-2.

he received

filed

2016

WL

1708538

trial

App.).

See

790 (2018).

a petition seeking post-conviction

ineffective assistance of

(Id. Ct.

counsel. His petition

relief,

on the basis

was summarily dismissed

by the magistrate.
Ill.

The appellant asserts the
conviction relief

based on

a

de novo), the

district

district

court erred

in

summarily dismissing the

ineffective assistance of

IV.

When

ISSUE ON APPEAL

trial

petition for post-

counsel.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

judge considers an appeal from a magistrate judge (not involving a

judge

is

acting as an appellate court, not as a

trial

court. State

v.

Kenner,

121 Idaho 594, 596, 826 P.2d 1306, 1308 (1992). The interpretation of law or statute
question of law over which the Court has free review. State

P.3d 57o, 574

A

(Ct.

petition

v.

Miller,

trial

is

a

134 Idaho 458, 462, 4

App. 2000).
for

post-conviction

a civil, rather than criminal,
proceeding, governed by the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. Like plaintiffs in
other civil actions, the petitioner must prove by a preponderance of evidence the
allegations upon which the request for post—conviction relief is based. A petition

for post-conviction

relief

initiates

from a complaint in an ordinary civil action,
however, in that it must contain more than “a short and plain statement of the
claim” that would suffice for a complaint under |.R.C.P. 8(a)(1). The petition must
be verified with respect to facts within the personal knowledge of the petitioner,
and affidavits, records or other evidence supporting its allegations must be
relief differs

must state why such supporting evidence is not
other words, the petition must present or be accompanied by
admissible evidence supporting its allegations, or it will be subject to dismissal.
Schultz v. State, 153 Idaho 791, 795-96, 291 P.3d 474, 478-79 (Ct. App. 2012)
attached,

or the petition

included.

In
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Idaho

Code

Section 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of a petition for
relief, either pursuant to motion of a party or upon the court's
“it
initiative,
if
appears from the pleadings, depositions, answers to

post-conviction

own

and admissions and agreements of facts, together with any
is no genuine issue of material fact and the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." |.C. § 19-4906(c). When
considering summary dismissal, the district court must construe disputed facts in
interrogatories,

affidavits submitted, that there

the petitioner's favor, but the court

is not required to accept either the petitioner's
unsupported by admissible evidence, or the
petitioner's conclusions of law. Moreover, because the district court rather than a
jury will be the trier of fact in the event of an evidentiary hearing, the district court

mere conclusory

allegations,

not constrained to draw inferences in the petitioner's favor, but is free to arrive
at the most probable inferences to be drawn from the evidence. Such inferences
is

will

not be disturbed on appeal

justify

if the uncontroverted evidence
them. 153 Idaho at 796, 291 P.3d at 479.

is

sufficient to

Claims may be summarily dismissed if the petitioner's allegations are clearly
disproven by the record of the criminal proceedings, if the petitioner has not
presented evidence making a prima facie case as to each essential element of
the claims, or if the petitioner's allegations do not justify relief as a matter of law.
Thus, summary dismissal of a claim for post-conviction relief is appropriate when
the court can conclude, as a matter of law, that the petitioner is not entitled to
relief even with all disputed facts construed in the petitioner's favor. For this
reason, summary dismissal of a post-conviction petition may be appropriate

even when the State does not controvert the
“Conversely,
facts that,

if

true,

if

the petition, affidavits, and other evidence supporting the petition allege

would

summarily dismissed.

must be conducted

petitioner's evidence. Id.

lf

entitle

the petitioner to

relief,

a genuine issue of material fact

to resolve the factual issues.”

trial

which,

if

is

153 Idaho

“On appeal from an order of summary dismissal,
by the

the post-conviction claim

we

may

not be

presented, an evidentiary hearing
at 796-97,

apply the

291 P.3d

at 479-80.

same standards

utilized

courts and examine whether the petitioner's admissible evidence asserts facts

true,

would

entitle

the petitioner to

relief.

Over questions

of law,

we

exercise free

review." 153 Idaho at 797, 291 P.3d at 480.

To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the defendant must
show that his attorney's performance was deficient and that the defendant was
prejudiced by the deficiency. To establish a deficiency, the applicant has the
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burden of showing that the attorney's representation fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness. To establish prejudice, the applicant must show a
reasonable probability that, but for the attorney's deficient performance, the
outcome of the proceeding would have been different. Id.

The
whether a

prejudice
trial

component

so

is

counsel’s performance

significant that

was

a court

deficient before

is

not required to analyze

examining the prejudice aspect.

In

addressing the prejudice component of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the

Supreme Court

of the United States

made

the following observation:

we have

Although

discussed the performance component of an ineffectiveness
claim prior to the prejudice component, there is no reason for a court deciding an
ineffective assistance claim to approach the inquiry in the same order or even to
address both components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient
showing on one. In particular, a court need not determine whether counsel's
performance was deficient before examining the prejudice suffered by the
defendant as a result of the alleged deficiencies. The object of an
ineffectiveness claim is not to grade counsel’s performance. If it is easier to
dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice,
which we expect will often be so, that course should be followed. Courts should
strive to ensure that ineffectiveness claims not become so burdensome to
defense counsel that the entire criminal justice system suffers as a result.
Strickland,

When
guess

466 U.S.

at 697.

evaluating ineffective assistance of counsel claims, the Court does not second-

strategic

and

tactical decisions,

conviction relief unless the decision

is

and such decisions cannot serve as a basis

shown

to

for post-

have resulted from inadequate preparation,

ignorance of the relevant law or other shortcomings capable of objective review. Payne, 146

Idaho at 561, 199 P.3d at 136. “There
within the

is

a strong presumption that counsel’s performance

wide range of professional assistance.” State

P.2d 1170, 1185 (1999)

v.

Hairston, 133 Idaho 496, 511,

(internal quotations omitted) (quoting

Aragon

v.

State,

fell

988

114 Idaho 758,

760, 760 P.2d 1174, 1176 (1988)).

The defendant
significant

also

must overcome a strong presumption

decisions

“that

counsel

made

all

the exercise of reasonable professional judgment.”
Cullen v. PinhO/ster, _U.S.
131 S.Ct. 1388, 1407, 179 L.Ed.2d 557, 579
(2011) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S.Ct. at 2066, 80 L.Ed.2d at
in

_,
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695)). “A fair

made

assessment

of attorney

performance requires that every

effort

be

eliminate

the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the
circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct
from counsel’s perspective at the time." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at
to

2065,
80 L.Ed.2d at 694. Thus, strategic decisions are “virtually
unchallengeable" if made after a “thorough investigation of law and facts
relevant to plausible options." Id. at 690, 104 S.Ct. at 2066, 80 L.Ed.2d at 695.
Decisions "made after less than complete investigation" are still reasonable to
the extent “reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on
investigation.” Id. at 691, 104 S.Ct. at 2066, 80 L.Ed.2d at 695. Counsel is
permitted to develop a strategy. Richter, 562 U.S. at 107, 131 S.Ct. at 789, 178
L.Ed.2d at 644.

The
his

petitioner pled guilty to the

DUI charge, reserving

his right to

appeal the denial of

suppression motion:

Where, as here, the

petitioner was convicted upon a guilty plea, to satisfy the
prejudice element, the petitioner must show there is a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel's errors, he or she would not have pled guilty and would

have insisted on going to trial. Plant v. State, 143 Idaho 758, 762, 152 P.3d 629,
633 (Ct. App. 2006). This Court has long adhered to the proposition that tactical
or strategic decisions of trial counsel will not be second-guessed on appeal
unless those decisions are based on inadequate preparation, ignorance of
relevant law, or other shortcomings capable of objective evaluation. Howard v.
State, 126 Idaho 231, 233, 880 P.2d 261, 263 (Ct. App. 1994). Boren v. State,
2016 WL 556364, *3 (Id. Ct. App.).
V.

The

petitioner

asserts

trial

ANALYSIS

counsel was ineffective because he objected to the

introduction of evidence at the suppression hearing concerning the reason

was unable

to reach the on-call magistrate

when

the State

was

why

trying to reach

warrant for a blood draw, after the appellant had refused to undergo

field

the prosecutor

him to obtain a

sobriety and breath

testing:

The on-call prosecutor from that night (Scott Bandy) testified at the hearing. His
testimony was substantially the same as the police officer’s about attempting to
contact the on-call magistrate. The prosecutor testified that he called the on-call
magistrate, Judge Mike Oths, at the judge's personal cell phone number, which
is the judge’s preferred method of contact. (Tr. p.
23.) The prosecutor called that
number and received no response and called it again to check he had dialed
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He

had, and

a voicemail requesting a return call and that it was for a
blood draw search warrant. (T. p. 23.) All told, the prosecutor called a certain
three times and perhaps five, and left a voicemail, maybe two. (Tr. p. 23-24.)
right.

left

The

on-call prosecutor then testified that the next day he conferred with the
magistrate and found that the ringer was off on his cell phone. (Tr. p. 24).
Defense counsel objected and moved to strike this evidence, and the court
sustained the objection. (Id.)

The on-duty prosecutor then

testified:

informed Trooper Sly that we had made substantial
efforts to try and contact the on—call magistrate and that based on
our inability to get in touch with him, that would provide an
exception to the warrant requirement due to the unavailability of
securing a warrant in a timely fashion. (Tr. p. 24). Verified Petition
for Post-Conviction Relief at 8-9.
At that point

The
on

|

petitioner relies heavily

on

this

paragraph from the Idaho Supreme Court‘s decision

his direct appeal:

The

district

court's observation

regarding the inability to contact the on-call

Ada County where

there are a number of magistrate
concern. The State has an obligation to provide a
functional and reliable system for obtaining warrants in circumstances like these,
both during regular office hours and through the night and on weekends. When
an on-call maqistrate is unable to be reached bv law enforcement, the State has
the burden of showinq whv that is the case and that qood cause exists for the
unavailability. Here the State souqht to present evidence as to the reason for the
maqistrate’s unavailability, but defense counsel obiected and the evidence was
magistrate, particularly

judges, does raise

stricken from the

mesumes

that the

in

some

record. With
trial

no such evidence

court ruled correctly. State

v.

in

the record, the Court

Chernobieff, 161 Idaho 537,

541, 387 P.3d 790, 794 (2016). (Emphasis added.)

The appellant submitted the
relevant part of the transcript

is

transcript of the suppression hearing as

where the

efforts to contact the on-call magistrate:

been

five [times that

mail.

maybe

off

on

two.

l

he attempted

did confer with

his cell phone.”

February

4,

on-call prosecutor

“And

to call him].

|

can
It’s

tell

you

was

for sure

early morning.

I

testifying

it

was

exhibit.

The

concerning his

three,

it

could have

did leave at least

Judge Mike Oths the next day and found

2014 Hearing Transcript

an

one voice

that his ringer

was

at 24.
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Trial

counsel for the appellant then stated: “Objection,

speculation."

to strike that

as hearsay,

Id.

The magistrate
sustain the objection.

A

move

ruled: “Well,

me

Took

don’t think

|

awhile to get there.

relevant.

it’s

Go

ahead."

l

don’t

know

that

be

it’s

—

I’ll

Id.

review of the remainder of the hearing transcript reveals that

trial

counsel focused his

witness examination and argument on the basis that there were not exigent circumstances
a warrantiess blood draw of the appellant and that the State's

present to

justify obtaining

inability to

contact a magistrate to secure a warrant should not suffice to

circumstances.
this court

See

where

id.

at 3-45.1

See

also

id.

at

essentially the prosecutor

33

(“I

think this

made an

show such exigent

case presents a conundrum

attempt to contact the judge, several

attempts, three to five by the testimony, but then he just authorized the blood draw.

we're going to allow prosecuting attorneys to

was

anything but a good

faith

attempt

——

make good

but

if

for

faith

attempts

m

And

if

I’m not saying there

that’s unsuccessful to just authorize blood

draws[.]"

When

evaluating ineffective assistance of counsel claims, the Court does not second—

guess strategic and

tactical decisions.

conviction relief unless the decision

is

Such decisions cannot serve as a basis

shown

to

for post-

have resulted from inadequate preparation,

ignorance of the relevant law or other shortcomings capable of objective review. The appellant

must also overcome the strong presumption

that counsel's performance

fell

within the

wide

range of professional assistance.

'See Missouri v. McNeer. 569 U.S. 141, 133 S.Ct. 1552. 1562-63. 185 L.Ed.2d 696 (2013) (“[l]mprovements in
communications technology do not guarantee that a magistrate judge will be available when an officer needs a
warrant after making a Iate-night arrest
exigent circumstances justifying a warrantless blood sample may
arise in the regular course of law enforcement due to delays from the warrant application process
Whether a
warrantless blood test of a drunk-driving suspect is reasonable must be determined case by case based on the
.

.

.

.

totality

.

.

of the circumstances.").
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As noted by

the State,

counsel’s objection prevented the magistrate from making

trial

the inference that “the prosecutor would never have been able to reach the magistrate that
night

because

his

phone

was

testimony, the magistrate
five

was

ringer

left

off.

By successfully

counsel’s decision

irrelevant.

effect

falls within

trying."

Respondent’s Brief

when an

demonstrating

why

magistrate

on-call

that occurred

at 19.

The

hearsay, and the magistrate ruled the statement

At the time of the suppression hearing there

that

to strike the

the wide range of professional assistance.

was arguably

on-call prosecutor’s statement

and moving

with evaluating simply the fact the prosecutor called three to

times over 10 minutes and then stopped
Trial

objecting

is

was no

unavailable,

and the burden

of

binding Idaho authority to the

the

State

has the burden of

showing that good cause existed

for the

unavailability.

The

appellant seeks to find

impermissible. See,

e.g.,

State

(“Under the Strickland two-part

performance was

trial

counsel ineffective on the basis of hindsight, which

Pon‘er,

v.

130 Idaho 772, 791, 948 P.2d 127, 146 (1997)

the claimant bears the burden of proving that counsel’s

test,

466 U.S.

deficient. Strickland,

at 680,

104 S.Ct.

at

2060—61.

In this analysis,

counsel's effectiveness must be evaluated from the time of the alleged error, not
Id.

at 681,

104 S.Ct.

when

Supreme

a magistrate

the burden of showing
unavailability.

in

hindsight.

at 2061.").

Prior to the Idaho

authority that

is

why

Court’s statement

is

That statement came

have had knowledge

the suppression appeal there

was no

unable to be reached by law enforcement, the State has

is

that

in

the case and that good cause exists to excuse the

in

the direct appeal of this case. Trial counsel could not

of the statement at the time of the suppression hearing. Also,

as noted

by the State. the appellant presented no evidence as to what the magistrate would have
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actually testified to concerning the reason

he did not respond

to the State’s efforts to contact

him that evening.
While the U.S. Supreme Court
(2013), references the “procedures

in

in

Missouri

place for obtaining a warrant or the availability of a

magistrate judge," as possible relevant factors,
magistrate

is

McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 133 S.Ct. 1152

v.

it

says nothing concerning the reason why a

unavailable as a relevant factor and does not specify or indicate that the State

would have the burden

of explaining the magistrate’s unavailability

demonstrate good cause

to

excuse the magistrate’s

unavailability.

1568 ("Although the Missouri Supreme Court referred

DWI

case,’

sense

that

358 S.W.3d,
it

a car accident, does not
traffic stop,

‘special facts,’ ibid.,

mean

a warrant

such as the procedures

magistrate judge,

may

affect

in

See McNeely, 133

is

to

S.Ct. at

case as “unquestionably a routine

a particular drunk-driving stop

at 74, the fact that

does not involve

to this

and have the burden

such as the need

is

‘routine’ in the

for the police to attend to

required. Other factors present

in

an ordinary

place for obtaining a warrant or the availability of a

whether the police can obtain a warrant

in

an expeditious way

and therefore may establish an exigency that permits a warrantless search. The relevant
factors

in

determining whether a warrantless search

is

reasonable, including the practical

problems of obtaining a warrant within a timeframe that
obtain reliable evidence,
Trial

made by

in

made a

The argument he made

determining exigent circumstance

the Idaho

Supreme Court
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preserves the opportunity to

no doubt vary depending upon the circumstances

counsel for the petitioner

without a warrant.
relevant

will

still

in

in

the case.").

substantial effort to suppress evidence obtained
that the unavailability of the magistrate

may have been

Chernobieff, p. 541.

in

error

in light

of the

was

not

comment

But counsel could not foresee that

9

Page 82

it

might be error to exclude an explanation of the Judge’s unavailability

in

the absence of prior

authority to that effect.

VI.

The
is

magistrate’s

affirmed.

Dated

this

summary

M

CONCLUSION

dismissal of the appellant’s petition for post-conviction

relief

day of July 2019.

,.6erald F. Schroéder

Senior

istrict

Judge
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